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1. Introduction
Different degrees of ownership concentration reflect the trade off between, on the one hand,
the diversification advantage of investing in many assets and, on the other hand, the (private) benefits
of controlling a firm. As Franks and Mayer (1995) point out, it is puzzling that the resolution of this
trade off has taken such a variety of forms in different countries. They classify the ownership
structures into two categories: insider and outsider systems. The equity markets of this first system
are characterised by few listed companies, an illiquid capital market where ownership and control is
infrequently traded and complex systems of intercorporate holdings. Consequently, these structures
are appropriately described as insider or entreprise-oriented systems as it is the corporate sector or
families and individuals who hold controlling interests and outsider investors, while able to
participate in equity returns through the stock market, are not able to exert much control.
Continental Europe and Japan fit into this broad classification. In contrast, the Anglo-American
system is a market oriented or outsider system and is characterised by a large number of listed
companies, a liquid capital market where ownership and control rights are frequently traded and few
intercorporate holdings.1  There are few large, controlling shareholdings and these are rarely
associated with the corporate sector itself. Diversified shareholdings are useful from the point of
view of risk reduction but discourage active participation of investors.
The main characteristics of the Belgian corporate ownership and equity market can be
summarized as follows : (i) few - merely 140 - Belgian companies are listed on the Brussels stock
exchange, (ii) there is a high degree of ownership concentration with an average largest direct
shareholding of 45%, (iii) holding companies and families, and to a lesser extent industrial
companies, are the main investor categories whose share stakes are concentrated into powerful
control blocks through business group structures and voting pacts, (iv) control is levered by
pyramidal and complex ownership structures and (v) there is a market for share stakes. Properties (i)
to (iv) imply that Belgium can be portrayed as a prototype of the 'insider system'. However, typical
for Belgium is the importance of cascades of holding companies which are used to lever control.2
Consequently, an ultimate investor can control a target company while holding relatively few cash
flow rights.
3
2. The separation of ownership and control in Belgium : the legal aspects.
2.1 Corporate landscape : the prevalence of the limited partnership (SPRL) and the stock
corporation (SA).
Belgium counts approximately 220,000 firm, most of which are small with half of them counting
less than five employees or less than BF 10 million of total assets. Two legal forms dominate: the
Société Privée à Responsabilité Limitée or the Besloten Vennootschap met Beperkte
Aansprakelijkheid (SPRL or BVBA, a limited liability partnership) and the Société Anonyme or
Naamloze Vennootschap (SA or NV, a stock corporation). There are about 90,000 companies of
each type3. Tables 1a, 1b and 1c present an overview of the legal corporate forms, their capital
requirements, number of companies, equity transfer procedures and accounting information
disclosure rules.
[insert Tables 1a, b, c about here]
SPRLs are the most numerous among small firms (99% of SPRLs are firms with less than BEF
100 millions of total assets). Their ownership certificates are nominative and the transferability of the
certificates is subject to restrictions, for example the agreement of the other partners. Most large
firms are SAs (84% of firms over 100 millions of total assets are SAs). Their distinguishing feature is
the possibility of issuing bearer shares with no restriction on their transferability.
There are currently approximately 140 Belgian registered firms that are listed on the official
market of the Brussels Stock Exchange. They are of various sizes and belong to all sectors of the
economy. Holding companies account for 23% of the market capitalisation, while electricity and gas
companies represent 20% of the capitalisation on the Brussels Stock Exchange. Other sectors with a
high market capitalisation are banks and financial services companies (14%), chemical companies
(9%) and insurance companies (8%). Market capitalisation is highly concentrated among a few large
firms: the Top 10 account for 50% of the total market capitalisation, while the Top 50 represent
95% of the market capitalisation. Turnover is low for smaller listed firms: the BEL20 market index,
which includes 20 firms, accounts for 83% of the total market turnover.
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2.2 Ownership disclosure legislation.
The notification rules
Up to 1989, little was known about the ownership structure of companies listed on the
Belgian stock exchanges, given the general use of bearer shares and the lack of ownership disclosure
obligation. The take over battle in 1988 between the French Compagnie Financière de Suez and the
de Benedetti group for the largest Belgian holding company, Generale Maatschappij van België
(Société Générale de Belgique), highlighted the problems due to informational uncertainty regarding
shareholdings and voting rights. The EU Transparency Directive4 provided the framework in which
new legislation concerning corporate control and ownership could be initiated. An Ownership
Disclosure Law5 was introduced in 1989 and amendments to the company law with regard to
takeovers’  were made in 1991.
The Ownership Disclosure Law requires all investors, both individuals and companies, to
reveal their share stakes in those companies governed by Belgian law, all or part of whose securities
conferring voting rights are officially listed on a stock exchange located in a Member State of the
European Union. In spite of the legislation’s title, the legislation is about the declarations of
important holdings of voting rights and not about holdings of capital. Notification is obligatory if a
shareholding equals or exceeds a threshold of 5 percent7 of voting rights. Furthermore, shareholders
have to declare any increases and decreases in ownership and their new ownership position if their
stake exceeds a multiple of 5 percent of the voting rights or falls below such a threshold.8 For
instance, a company that has revealed that it owns a stake of 11 percent will have to notify the
Banking Commission9 again once this ownership stake reaches 15 percent or more, or decreases
below the 10%-threshold.
Real and potential voting rights
The notification percentages refer to real and potential voting rights. As a result, ownership
of securities convertible into shares (convertible bonds, warrants, etc) is treated similarly in terms of
disclosure as vote bearing shares in the company.10 So, when investors make voting rights
declarations, they include: (i) the percentage of the actual total voting rights they own, proportional
to all the actual voting rights outstanding, (ii) the potential voting rights, as a percentage to the
aggregate of all potential voting rights and (iii) the percentage of cumulative actual and potential
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voting rights in the company based on the aggregate number of the voting rights associated with all
outstanding shares and convertible instruments.11
Indirect ownership, investor groups and voting pacts.
The transparency legislation does not only apply to natural and legal persons owning voting
rights directly, but also to those investors who control voting rights indirectly via a pyramid structure
of intermediate companies.12 Investors are obliged to reveal whether they are affiliated to an investor
group of companies or whether they act ‘in concert13’ with other investors. Throughout the paper we
distinguish among direct shareholdings, group blocks and voting blocks. Group blocks are the sum
of the direct shareholdings controlled by the same ultimate investor (an individual, a family, an
industrial company). Voting blocks consist of direct shareholdings or group blocks  of which the
(ultimate) investors have made voting agreements. If the real or potential voting rights of the
individual investor,  the group block or the voting block exceed or fall below the notification
thresholds, the cumulative and individual direct and indirect ownership positions and changes in
voting rights should be disclosed. The Commission for Banking and Finance suggests that the
ultimate controlling shareholder of a business or investor group assume notification responsibility for
voting rights of its own direct and indirect holdings and for those share stakes held by investors this
'reference shareholder' is affiliated to or acts in concert with.14 In the case of voting pacts, the same
rules as for business groups apply.
In addition, once the stake of an investor (or of the investors belonging to the same investor
group) reaches 20 percent of the voting rights of the company or falls bellow this threshold, the
strategic policy with regard to the target has to be declared to the Banking Commission and the
target.15
Notification Process.
The investor who purchases or sells shares (the voting rights) or potential voting rights has to
disclose his control position and the changes herein to the target company and to the Commission for
Banking and Finance in Brussels at the latest on the second working day after the transaction, if a
notification threshold has been transgressed. Standardised sheets guarantee homogeneity in the
declarations. Apart from the number and percentage of real and potential voting rights, a notification
sheet reveals the identity of the investor, the investor’s business group (if appropriate), voting pacts,
policy statements (20% rule) and the date referring to the change in voting rights.
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The target company who has been notified about changes in ownership by substantial
investors, has a maximum of one working day after disclosure to pass on this information to the
Documentation and Statistics Department of the Brussels Stock Exchange (Maertens 1994). This
department updates its on-line ownership database DBPart, makes this information available ad
valvas on the trading floor (parquet)16 and prepares the information for publication in the Cote de la
Bourse17, a Stock Exchange publication that is inserted in the two Belgian financial newspapers, De
Financieel Economische Tijd and L'Echo de la Bourse. The same notification timing applies to
disclosure of investors' policies (20% ownership rule). Moreover, the target company will have to
publish this voting rights information in its annual report.
An investor's failure to disclose a substantial shareholding may lead to an interdiction to the
investor in question to participate to the annual meeting, to a cancellation of the annual meeting
which has been called for, to a suspension of the exercise of all or part of the rights pertaining to the
securities for a certain period and even to liability to penalties18.19  The voting rights of recently
acquired major shareholdings (5% and more) can only be exercised 45 days after notification.20
Ownership disclosure of non-listed companies
The EC Directive and the subsequent national legislation only refer to transparency of listed
companies. Still, Belgian law also requires every corporate shareholder of a non-listed Société
Anonyme (NV) registered in Belgium, to notify this company as soon as this shareholder holds more
than 10% of the total votes of one category of shares. When the notification decreases to less than
10%, a similar notification has to take place. However, in practice, this rule is not strictly respected
(Becht, 1997). There is still an indirect way of gathering partial information on shareholdings in non-
listed public firms. All SAs (NVs), both listed and non-listed, are obliged to publish in their annual
report, the content of their shareholding portfolios in other firms, be it Belgian or foreign.
The shares of private firms (like the SPRL or BVBA) are always nominative and the owners are
registered in a register of partners. To the public, the ownership structure is not accessible; only the
partners, fiscal authorities and third parties having an interest in the firm, like debtors or creditors,
can consult the register.
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2.3 Voting rights dilution and restrictions, and the rights of the minority shareholders.
In principle, the general assembly takes decisions based on a simple majority of the voting
rights. Since 1991, the balance of corporate power has shifted to the controlling shareholders whom
have been given legal instruments to entrench their position in the company and to protect
themselves against undesired takeovers. Anti-takeover instruments, like share repurchase schemes or
issuance of warrants, can be installed by the board of directors at any moment in time if the
shareholders have given authorisation to the board. Such an authorisation remains valid for a
maximum of 5 years but can be reinstated for a similar period (Wymeersch 1994a).21 Such measures
have further reduced the likelihood of hostile takeovers in Belgium.22
However, to provide more protection to small shareholders a supermajority of 75 percent of
the voting rights voted at the general assembly, is needed with regard to decisions about changes in
the acts of incorporation, increases of the equity capital, limitations or changes in the preferential
rights of existing shareholders to purchase shares in new equity issues, changes in the rights of
different classes of shareholders23, repurchases of shares and changes in the legal form of the
corporation (Lievens 1994).
Since 1991, minority shareholders or a group of minority shareholders owning at least 1 percent
of the equity capital or shares with a value of not less than BEF 50 million, can appoint one or more
experts who can scrutinise the company's accounting and its internal operations.24 The appointment
of experts is conditional on indications that the interests of the company have been violated.
Shareholders owning at least 1 percent of the votes can initiate a minority claim against the directors
for the benefit of the company, if it can be proven that the directors have managed or supervised the
company poorly and if the minority shareholders have voted against the directors' discharge25 at the
annual meeting. For instance, a minority claim would be justified when directors ensured that the
company paid out benefits to large shareholders they represent at the detriment of the company.26
Another important change, since the law of 1991, is the abolition of automatic voting rights
restrictions.27 This abolition was motivated by the fact that the restrictions could be easily evaded by
redistributing the shares to family members, friends and subsidiaries. Still, as in Germany, individual
companies can still apply voting right restrictions by including such clauses in the acts of
incorporation. While automatic voting restrictions are abolished, voting agreements among
shareholders for (renewable) periods of 5 years are allowed since 1991 if these agreements do not
limit the responsibilities of the directors or are used to create different classes of voting rights.
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2.4 Limitations on cross-shareholdings
Belgian law restricts cross-shareholdings between two firms to a maximum of 10% of the voting
capital. This rule applies for two independent firms when one of the two firms has its headquarters in
Belgium. It applies also between a mother firm and its subsidiaries: the subsidiaries taken together
may not hold more than 10% of the mother's voting capital. Furthermore firms are obliged to
liquidate the cross-shareholdings acquired in violation (or ignorance) of the law. Shares have to be
liquidated within one year and the votes attached to the shares are suspended before the alienation.
2.5 Ownership cascades and pyramids as main separation devices.
A substantial number of share stakes are held by other companies which in turn are held by
other shareholders. Such cascade or pyramidal ownership structures have been typical in the Belgian
corporate landscape, but are beginning to disappear. For example, the pyramid structure used by the
French Suez group to control the Belgian electricity utility Electrabel is disappearing. Suez has
started to delist its Belgian utility interests and to convert them into ordinary, closely held
subsidiaries.
However, some important pyramidal structures still exist, most notably the Belgo-Canadian
Frére-Desmarais group (see Appendix). A series of holding companies and legal instruments is used
to control a vast industrial empire with relatively small cash-flow stakes. The structure has a double
vertex. On the European side Baron Albert Frére presides over a control chain that involves a family
holding, two non-listed Belgian holdings, a listed Belgian holding and a Dutch holding company. On
the Canadian side, Paul Desmarais Sr. controls three companies that control the Power Corporation
of Canada and the Power Financial Corporation, two listed companies. Through a series of
Canadian, Dutch, Belgian and Swiss holding companies the partners control a number of important
Belgian and French companies.
Previous examples clarified that the true owners of the Belgian sample companies are mostly
not the direct shareholders (at ownership level 1), but that control is exercised by an ultimate
shareholder on a higher ownership tier in the pyramid. It is important to identify these ultimate
voting blockholders so that the percentages of voting rights held by direct or first-level shareholders
controlled by the same ultimate investor can be aggregated into investor groups. Such investor group
is named after and classified according to the identity and shareholder class of the ultimate
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shareholder.28 Fortunately, the Large Holdings Directive forces such blockholders to declare their
voting power, not matter how “distant” they are from the listed company where they cast the votes.
3. Data collection
Ownership data were collected for the period 1989, the adoption of the transparency
legislation, until 1995. In 1989 and 1995, respectively, 186 and 140 companies were listed29. 40% of
the Belgian listed companies are holding companies with multi-industry investments, 13% are in the
financial sector (banking, insurance and real estate) and 47% are industrial and commercial
companies.
Data on the ownership structure over the period 1989-1995 were collected from the
Documentation and Statistics Department of the Brussels Stock Exchange, which maintains a daily
updated database BDPart (Bourse Data Participations) of the shareholding structure of Belgian listed
companies. BDPart provides data on the first level of shareholding (direct ownership) in all Belgian
listed companies, such as the names of the investors, the number of shares declared, number of
shares issued and the percentage of ownership. Apart from voting rights linked to the shareholdings,
BDPart also displays potential voting rights linked to securities that will represent voting rights when
converted or exercised. Previous ownership positions in the BDPart database are overwritten once
new ownership information becomes available. To capture a company's ownership position at the
end of its fiscal year since 1989 and changes in shareholdings during each year, about 5000 hardcopy
Notifications of Ownership Change from 1989 till 1994 were consulted. Apart from details on voting
rights, the investors' status (independent, affiliated or acting in concert with other investors) was
compiled from the Notifications in order to construct the shareholdings of business groups and
voting pacts. With this information about major direct shareholdings and indirect control, the multi-
layered ownership structure was reconstructed for each company over the period 1989-1994. The
shareholding data from BDPart and the Notifications of Ownership Change over the period 1989-
1994 were verified with ownership data of the database of the National Bank which is based on
annual reports.30 For indirect ownership data of 1995, a more elaborate methodology has been used.
We used the CD-Rom ‘BNB’, produced by Bureau Van Dijk with tapes supplied by the Central
Bank, to gather all shareholdings that Belgian firms are required to report to the Central bank if such
a shareholding exceeds 10% of the voting capital of the target firm. By collecting all the large
investments of Belgian companies, we reconstructed the ownership pyramid of Belgian companies.
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The yearbooks of Trends 20,000, which comprise industry sector classification and financial data for
most listed and non-listed Belgian companies, were used to classify all Belgian investors into the
following categories: (i) holding companies, (ii) banks, (iii) institutional investors, (iv) insurance
companies, (v) industrial companies, (vi) families and individual investors, (vii) federal or regional
governments and (viii) real estate investors. Foreign companies owning a large share stake in Belgian
companies were classified with information from Kompass.
As disclosure is only obligatory for shareholdings exceeding 5% (or 3% if the company so
chooses) our ownership data are truncated. Still, we were able to collect many shareholdings of less
than 5% because, when an investor with a small shareholding belongs to an investor group or is
involved in a voting pact, his share stake will be disclosed as well. Furthermore, the potential voting
rights, referring to warrants and convertibles are to be disclosed such that, along with these potential
voting rights, small stakes or real voting rights are also disclosed. For five companies, the stock
exchange did not receive any ownership notifications. These companies were not included in our
1995 database31.
4. Direct shareholdings, Group blocks and Voting blocks.
The Belgian transparency legislation requires investors not to disclose cash flow rights, but
deals with voting rights. Still, the discrepancy between direct share stakes and voting rights is rather
small as the principle of one-share-one-vote is usually upheld within one ownership tier. Direct share
stakes are shareholdings on the first ownership tier and belong to an single shareholder. Some of
these direct share stakes belong to group blocks as they are controlled by an ultimate shareholder
who may use a pyramid of intermediate companies to control several direct shareholdings. Finally,
there are also voting coalitions between shareholders or group blocks, which we call voting blocks.
Of the 140 companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange, for 135 companies there was at least
one ownership notification in 1995. Overall, there are 269 notified voting blocks, 431 group blocks
and 551 direct shareholdings. Table 2 shows that the average listed firm has 5 direct shareholders, 3
group blocks and two voting blocks. Eighty percent of the voting blocks count 2 to 5 shareholders.
In three quarters of the cases a group block corresponds to a voting block.
[Insert table 2 about here]
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4.1 Direct shareholdings
Figure 1 shows the direct voting power of the largest and subsequent share stakes of the 135
listed companies in 1995. All shareholders are considered in isolation (without considering the fact
whether they take part in a voting block). The largest shareholder holds on average 45% of the votes
(see also table 3) while the second largest owns 12.8%. This confirms that  Belgian direct ownership
is highly concentrated. In order to get majority control of 50%, the largest shareholder ought to form
a coalition with the second or third largest shareholders. Still, in practice, atomistic shareholders do
not usually exercise their voting rights on the annual meetings such that the largest average
shareholder might a de facto absolute control.
[Insert figure 1 about here]
[Insert table 3 about here]
The histogram of the largest direct share stakes of Figure 2 exhibits peaks at the 25% and the
50% thresholds, indicating the importance of blocking minorities and majority control respectively.
There are relatively few direct voting blocks in the range 35-50%. In Belgium, the mandatory bid
rule requires shareholder who accumulate a shareholding which leads to a change in control at a
price higher than the market to make a tender offer for the other outstanding shares. In practice, it is
the court that can decide whether a control change has taken place or not. If a stake of about one
third of the voting rights is acquired, in most cases this is regarded as a control change. Therefore,
either companies deliberately remain underneath the 33.3% threshold or acquire more than 50% of
the voting rights. The mandatory bid threshold might also explain why there are relatively many share
stakes of more than 66.66% of the voting rights
[Insert figure 2 about here]
On average, the sum of the direct share stakes held by large shareholders (who own at least 5%
of the outstanding shares) amounts to more than 65% in 1994 (Table 4). Cumulative direct
ownership is higher, almost 70% in the financial sector, and around 65% for both holding companies,
and the industrial and commercial companies. It is clear that the concentrated ownership structure
does not facilitate hostile takeovers if the acquirer does not initially have a large toehold. Panel A of
Table 3 in the appendix shows that a coalition of the largest three owners is needed for absolute
control; they own on average more than 59%.32
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[Insert table 4 about here]
4.2 Voting blocks33
The largest voting blocks in listed companies control, on average, 56% of the voting rights,
giving them absolute majority control (Figure 3). The second and third largest voting blocks are
much smaller with combined share stakes of respectively 6.6 and 4.5%. The histogram (Figure 4)
with the largest direct share stakes which are controlled by a voting block shows peaks at the 50-
60% level and the 65-70% level reflecting the absolute majority threshold and the qualified majority
level (2/3 of the votes) which is required for certain decisions at the annual meeting. In only 17% of
the listed companies, a voting block owns a supermajority (75% or more), a voting rights threshold
allowing the voting blockholder to change the acts of incorporation, including voting rights (see also
Figure 5).34 Table 5 details the most important blockholders by name and Table 6 by type. For
example, the Generale Maatschappij/Société Générale controlled by the French holding Suez-
Lyonaise des Eaux, is present as a voting block holder in 16 listed companies and controls an
average voting rights package of over 50% (Table 5).
[insert Figures 3, 4 and 5 about here]
[insert Tables 5 and 6 about here]
The evolution of ownership in concentrated companies with a shareholding of at least 25%35
since 1989 is given in Table 7. Ownership concentration of the largest direct shareholding has
increased slightly over a 6 year period since the transparency legislation. Considering only those
companies with a largest shareholding of more than 25%, the average largest direct shareholding has
increased from 55% to about 58%. Ultimate levered control is defined as the product of the
intermediate shareholdings between the sample company and the ultimate controlling shareholder.36
The average levered shareholding’s increase from 38% to almost 42% is largely due to a shortening
of the ownership pyramids.  All in all, from 1989 to 1994, there have been no substantial  changes in
the aggregate concentration of ownership in Belgian listed companies. Renneboog (1999) shows that
there is an active market in controlling share stakes in Belgium, but given the value of control as
reflected in the control premium, share blocks do not tend to get dispersed.
[insert Table 7 about here]
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4.3 Categories of Shareholders
Table 4 also exhibits the cumulative ownership of the three most important investor classes:
holding companies, families and individual investors, and industrial and commercial companies.37
From panel A can be concluded that holding companies are the largest direct investors; they hold on
average 33% of the shares and account for half of the substantial ownership stakes in Belgian
companies. Domestic and foreign holding companies have invested more in the Belgian holding
companies than in the industrial and in the financial sector. Direct investment by industrial and
services companies totals almost 15% (panel A) and is focused on other Belgian listed industrial and
commercial companies (panel D). Families' direct investment is of less importance with an average
stake of about 4%. The table shows not only ownership at the direct level but also the average stake
held by voting blocks, where the voting blocks (labelled ‘ultimate’ in the table) are classified into
shareholder categories based on the identity of the ultimate controlling shareholder.
Holding companies.
The analysis on the basis of voting blocks reveals that, although holding companies remain
the most important shareholder class in Belgian listed companies, their average cumulative
shareholding on an ultimate control basis decreases to 26.7% from an average direct shareholding of
32.7 (panel A, Table 4). The differences are explained by the fact that family controlled holding
companies are now classified according to the identity of the ultimate investors, namely, families and
individuals. Belgian holding companies are substantial investors in all sectors: in other Belgian
holding companies (panel B), in the financial sector (panel C) and in industrial and commercial
companies (panel D). The importance of the Belgian holding companies and the lack of large share
stakes held by banks should be understood in its historic framework : banking and investment
business had to be separated by law in 1934. This resulted in the creation of large financial holding
companies which became the major shareholders in the financial institutions and diversified their
investments over a wide gamut of industrial and commercial sectors. Pyramidal ownership structures
allowed holding companies to exercise levered control with relatively small share stakes (an example
is provided in the appendix).38
Industrial and commercial companies
The average shareholding held by industrial and commercial companies decreases from a direct
shareholding of 14.6% to a shareholding of 10.8% as some companies are controlled by either
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holdings or families and individuals. Industrial and commercial companies seem more inclined to hold
substantial stakes in other industrial firms (panel D).
Family shareholders.
Belgian families own a voting rights majority in 15% of the industrial and commercial
companies and hold 26% of the shareholdings of at least 25%. Individual and family investors
frequently do not hold shares directly in Belgian listed and non-listed companies, but use
intermediate companies as their average concentrated ownership amounts to almost 16%, while
direct stakes held by individual and family investors average only 4% (panel A). Family shareholdings
are most distinctly present in the ownership structure of industrial and commercial companies (panel
D) with an average substantial shareholding of nearly 20%.
Financial Institutions.
As of 1934, 'credit institutions' were prohibited from taking share participations in industrial
companies. Only since the 1993 Credit Institutions Act39 which implemented the Second Banking
Directive of the European Union, are credit institutions (banks, savings banks and other financial
institutions) entitled to hold shares in industrial corporations and holding companies. Currently,
credit institutions are allowed to hold up to 60% of their equity in shares of non-financial companies,
with  a maximum of 15% of their equity capital invested in a single company. There is no limitation
with regard to the percentage of the outstanding shares of an individual company a credit institution
is allowed to own. In practice, banks still do not invest much in shares of non-financial companies to
avoid conflicts of interest :
- According to Belgian law, banks are held liable towards creditors of bankrupt companies, if
the banks granted credit to these companies at times when a reasonably prudent banker should not
have granted nor maintained the credit. A substantial shareholding in a financially distressed company
by a bank might influence that bank's decision with regard to ceasing additional credit.
- Since most banks are controlled by a holding company which might be a substantial
shareholder in a company, it is doubtful whether banks would be able to make independent decisions
with regard to a shareholding in that company or granted loans.
- Most investment and pension funds are managed by a bank which ensures the distribution of
the investment fund's certificates (shares). Legally, investment and pension funds' management
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should use the voting rights associated with the shares of a company they have invested in,
independent of the managing bank.
The Government
In principle, the federal state does not invest in listed Belgian companies. But it owns 50% of
the shares of the National Bank, of which the shares are listed in the Brussels Stock Exchange, and
50% of the 'public credit institutions'. The role of the public credit institutions has been broadened to
that of a bank and these banks have been privatised. The 'public investment companies', owned by
the regional governments hold blocks in shares of a few listed companies. Those investments were
made either to save ailing companies or to provide small risky companies with growth capital so as
to stimulate and support entrepreneurial and industrial expansion. In general, in contrast to France,
federal and regional governments have not considered their shareholdings in companies as a long
term financial investment. Only in two percent of the listed companies, the state still holds a share
stake via the regional investment companies.
Employee shareholdership.
Since 1991, mechanisms of beneficial acquisition of shares by employees have been
introduced. In general, employee ownership in most companies remains low. For instance, employees
of Petrofina own 5.4% of the shares; in de Bank Brussels Lambert, employees hold 7%; in Creyf's
Interim 0.9%; in Desimpel Kortemark 0.5%; in Royale Belge, 0.69% (Wymeersch 1994a).
Institutional investors.
Belgian institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, credit institutions,
investment funds and investment companies) usually hold small share stakes (of under 5%), but own
in aggregate about 18% of the shares in Belgian listed companies.40 For instance, the average
shareholding of all Bevek/Sicav-investment funds41 in the 60 most traded Belgian companies,
amounted to 4% in 1995 and the average shareholding of pension funds measures about 1.5%.42
Insurance companies are legally allowed to invest up to 25% of their reserves in shares listed on the
Belgian stock exchanges, but owned only about 12% of the Belgian shares over the period 1986-
1991. Most institutional investors reinforce the present majority's power by systematically voting in
favour of management or, more commonly, by not taking part in the general assembly.
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4.4 Foreign shareholder classes
The relative importance of domestic and foreign investors is examined in the last two
columns of Table 4. More than 75% of the direct large shareholdings (or an average of 49.4% of the
voting rights) are held by Belgian investors, while foreign investors' direct investments account for an
average of 16%. This proportion is similar for holding companies (panel B) and the industrial firms
(panel D), but for the financial sector, domestic investments are higher with an average of 55%
(panel C). When we consider voting blocks, columns 5 and 6 show that foreign investors often use
Belgian intermediary companies to control Belgian listed companies. Domestic ownership in a
Belgian company amounts to nearly 40%; slightly lower (36%) in holding companies, and somewhat
higher (43%) in industrial and service companies. Foreign investors hold about 38% of the
substantial shareholdings (or an average of 24.3% of the total number of shares) in Belgian listed
companies.
Of the foreign investors, it is primarily the holding companies that hold large share stakes and
control with a majority stake in 15% of all the Belgian listed companies.43 Foreign holding companies
invest predominantly in Belgian holding companies, one fourth of which they control with a majority
of the voting rights. This way foreign holding companies also indirectly invest in unlisted Belgian
companies with shares held in the investment portfolios of Belgian holding companies. Foreign
industrial companies prefer Belgian industrial companies as long term investments, while foreign
banks and insurance companies are substantial shareholders in the Belgian financial and insurance
sector. Foreign institutional investors do not rely heavily on the Belgian stock market.
Although shareholders from a wide variety of countries44 are present in the ownership
structure of Belgian listed companies, the main investors are from the neighbouring European
countries. Dutch investors own an average direct share stake of 3.8% and invest predominantly in
Belgian industrial and commercial companies. German direct average ownership is low. German
industrial companies mainly invested in the concrete industry via e.g. Heidelberger Zement. Investors
from Luxembourg own, on average, directly 4.1% of Belgian companies, and have invested mainly in
industrial and commercial companies. But, companies from Luxembourg are almost never the
ultimate investor and are used as intermediary investment vehicles by e.g. French companies. North
American and U.K. shareholders hold large stakes in only 3 companies. Only one large shareholding
of a Belgian listed company is Japanese: Ashaki acquired a majority stake in the glass manufacturer
Glaverbel. The average French direct average shareholding is higher and close to 4.3%.The single
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most important foreign ultimate investors are French; their accumulated substantial shareholdings
amount on average to almost 13%. They invest mainly in the Belgian holding companies of which
they own an average stake of 19% and in the financial sector in which they hold an average of 14%
of the voting rights. Via controlling participations in Belgian large holding companies, French
investors control a substantial part - estimated at 30% - of all the listed and unlisted industrial
companies in Belgium. In fact, it is the French holding companies, rather than French family
investors or industrial companies that have acquired substantial stake of the Belgian listed
companies. French insurance companies own significant shareholdings in the Belgian banks and
insurance companies.
5. Conclusion.
This chapter has documented how the ownership disclosure requirements have been
translated in national law and that ownership is strongly concentrated in Belgium with the largest
shareholder owning an average direct stake of 45%. The direct shareholdings are large, but actual
ownership concentration is even higher by the formation of group blocks: some ultimate investors
control via intermediate (holding) companies. Furthermore, voting blocks are formed by voting
coalitions between ultimate investors such that the average largest voting block amounts to 56%.
Institutional investors seldom hold more than 5% of the voting rights, but overall account for
about one fifth of the shares. The presence of large foreign shareholders in Belgian listed companies
is important; holdings from Luxembourg are often found as intermediate companies in the cascade
structure, but are rarely ultimate controlling shareholders. In contrast, French holding companies like
the Groupe Suez-Lyonaise des Eaux and the Paribas holding Cobepa control a substantial part of the
listed (and non-listed) Belgian companies.
This paper has also reported recent changes in legislation which have made existing shareholder
even more powerful in warding off take over threats. Still, Belgian shareholders do not pay a high
price for control as ownership cascades violate the one-share-one-vote rule. The cash flow rights,
which reflect the actual equity stake, owned by an ultimate shareholder are often substantially lower
than his control rights.
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Endnotes :
1 Wymeersch (1994b) makes a distinction similar to Franks & Mayer (1992) between  company-oriented and
enterprise-oriented systems. A company-oriented system is characterised by the existence of a large number of listed
companies. Most of the their shares are effectively traded on the markets. The monitoring function is essentially
undertaken by the securities market and active market trading is an essential prerequisite for efficient monitoring.
Privileged tools of intervention are the appointment of non executive directors who are chosen on their technical
abilities and the designation of special board committees. Ultimately, takeovers drive out inefficient management. The
U.S. and the U.K. fall clearly under the definition of a company-oriented corporate control system. An enterprise-
oriented system has a low number of listed companies, control is held by major shareholder so that a limited number
of shares are effectively on the market. Monitoring does not take place via the market, but is regulated by group law.
2 In this sense, the Italian equity market is similar to the Belgian one : few companies are quoted, concentration of
ownership is high, pyramidal ownership structures with holding companies as intermediate investment vehicles are
common ( Bianchi and Casavola 1995). But, whereas the Italian state controls a large number of industrial groups and
holding companies, Belgian state ownership is rare.
3 All listed companies are SAs or NVs with exception of 5  real estate Bevaks (Sicafi) : Cofinimmo, Cibix,
Wereldhave, Befimmo, Warehouse estates Belgium.
4 Council Directive of 12 December 1988 (88/627/EEC).
5 Law of 2 March 1989,  Loi sur la transparance des participations importantes dans les sociétés privées, also called
'Transparantiewetgeving' (transparency legislation) and Royal Decrees of 10 May 1989 and of 8 November 1989. The
legislation was published on 24 May 1989 in the Belgian Official Journal (Belgisch Staatsblad, Moniteur Belge) and
most of the relevant rules became effective on 3 June 1989
 6 Law of 18 July 1991.
 7 Individual companies can reduce this threshold in the articles of incorporation 3% (but not less). Notification of
changes in stakes by the shareholders will have to be made if the following thresholds are passed : 3%, 5%, 10%,
15%, and further multiples of 5%. (Law of 2 March 1989, Section 5.) Currently, about 20 companies have adopted the
3% threshold.
8 Until 31 December 1990, individuals and families (‘natural persons’) and companies (‘legal persons’) could send
their notification to Banking Commission and request confidentiality.
9 The Commission for Banking and Finance, usually abbreviated to Banking Commission, is the Belgian equivalent of
the S.E.C. in the U.S. In a strict legal sense, the authority of the Banking Commission in the area of ownership
disclosure supervision and M&A activity is limited, but the Commission has considerable influence on market
participants on the basis of its 'moral authority'.
10 Law of 2 March 1989, Section 1, paragraph 3. Note that this article was initially interpreted as referring to all
potential voting rights regardless whether these voting rights were linked to existing securities (as in the case with
common stock options) or securities that would be newly created (as in the case with warrants or convertible debt).
Options on common stock would in this case entail double counting of voting rights. In the case of warrants or
convertibles, there is not such double counting, as the voting rights will be created at the exercise time when a new
share comes into being. Analysis of the notification sheets reveals that the confusion has gradually disappeared and
that the disclosure has focused more on potential voting rights related to new securities (warrants and convertibles).
11  Banking Commission 1989, p. 4-6.
12  'Note on the application of the Law of  2 March 1989' (Banking Commission 1989 p.2).
13   The definition of 'affiliated investors' is given in Article 5 of the Royal Decree of 10 May 1989 and is based on the
Royal Decree of 8 October 1976 on the company's annual accounts and consolidation of accounts. 'Acting in concert' is
defined in Articles 7 of the Royal Decree of 10 May 1989. Companies acting in concert have agreements with regard
to the possession, the acquisition and the selling of securities.
14  Banking Commission 1989 p.8-9.
15 Most 'strategy' statements, however, have a low informational content. For instance, on 14 March 1994, Generale
Maatschappij van België (Société Générale de Belgique), the reference shareholder for Union Minière and Naviga,
notified that these three shareholders had liquidated their combined shareholdings of 62% in Asturienne because 'the
share stake is not considered as strategic'.
16  If a target faxes a ownership notification to the Stock Exchange in the morning, this information is disclosed to the
floor at 11.00 a.m. at the earliest via the bulletin board (ad valvas) and via the on-line BDPart database. Important
news is via this channel quickly dispersed via Tijd Electronic Services or Reuters.
17  The information in the Cote de la Bourse is the full responsibility of the Stock Exchange. The Cote de la Bourse in
its current form appeared as of 1 January 1992. Before this date, the Stock Exchange disclosed information via de
Wisselkoerslijst which was sent to about 1000 subscribers, mostly brokerage houses, banks, institutional investors and
news agencies.
18  Penalties are enumerated in Section 204 of the Coordinated Laws on Commercial Companies.
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19  Law of 2 March 1989, Sections 7-11. In May 1995, minority shareholders of PB Finance, a listed real estate
company, sued the Dutch holding Euver in order to annul Euver's voting rights or to limit them to 5% because Euver
had not disclosed the size of its shareholding (of 67%) to the Commission of Banking and Finance and there were
suspicions of fraud.
20  Ownership Disclosure Law of 2 March 1989, article 6.
21  The percentage of ownership of the major shareholders is often an underestimation of the real corporate power
these shareholders can exercise. The board, nominated by the major shareholders, could interpret a takeover threat as
'grave and imminent danger' which would allow them to repurchase shares. Furthermore, the board can allow share
warrants to be exercised or sold to friendly shareholders for a maximum of 10% of equity capital in order to dilute
shareholdings of a potential raider. This authority, for a maximum but renewable period of 5 years, has to be granted
specifically to the board by the annual general meeting. Autocontrol mechanisms can also be installed whereby the
company's shares are held by a subsidiary. However, a subsidiary's stake in the mother company is restricted to 10%.
22  The mandatory bid rule which has existed since 1965 on a self-regulatory basis has been incorporated into the
amendments of law of 1991. The rule requires the acquirer of shares, in as far as control has changed at a price higher
than the market price, to bid for all remaining shares and the bid price should be set at a premium above the highest
market price over the last 12 months. This way, equal treatment of shareholders is ensured since all shareholders are
offered the benefit of the control premium. Furthermore, the propensity to trade large blocks, resulting in companies
taken over against their will, is diminished.
23  There are additional conditions for changes in the rights of different classes of shareholders. The board of directors
needs to document the reasons for the changes extensively and has to send that report to all shareholders before the
annual meeting. On the annual meeting, the proposal is only valid if 50% of the total outstanding voting rights are
present and 75% of each category of shareholders votes in favour (Company Law, article 71).
24  Law of 18 June 1991, article 191. This law reduced the threshold from 20% to 1%.
25 At the annual general meeting, the directors are 'discharged' from liabilities that may arise in the future if
shareholders present at the annual meeting judge, with information from the external auditors and data in the annual
report, that the directors fulfilled their tasks adequately during the fiscal year.
26 Note that the minority claim (Company Law articles 66 bis paragraph 2, article 132 bis and article 158 bis) is for
the benefit of the company and not for the benefit of the minority shareholder directly, although the minority
shareholders, like all shareholders, might benefit. Consequently, this procedure to appoint experts cannot be used
following conflicts between shareholders, but only if the company's economic position and its long term survival is
endangered. Case law is rare, but the appointment of experts was justified in these cases: the stocks were overvalued, a
company was badly managed and had negative earnings (Lievens 1994). In addition to lowering the threshold level for
the minority claim, the rules of conflicts of interest have been tightened : personal liability cannot be excluded if
directors take undue advantage of their position to the detriment of the company (Wymeersch 1994a). An individual
liability claim can only be initiated if the shareholder can prove that he has experienced personal damage.
27  Before 1991, no shareholder could participate in the voting at the annual meeting for more than 20 percent of the
voting rights associated with the total shares outstanding or for more than 40 percent of the voting rights associated
with shares represented at the annual meeting. The restriction limiting the exercise of voting rights most had priority.
28 In section 4, we use the following definition: control exerted by an ultimate shareholder on a sequence of
intermediate companies and, ultimately, on the sample company exists if (i) there is a series of uninterrupted majority
shareholdings on every ownership tier throughout the pyramid or (ii) if there is a large shareholding of at least 25 %
on every ownership level in the absence of other shareholders with stakes of blocking minority size or larger. This
criterion is used in the tables to calculate group blocks and identify the ultimate shareholder.
29 The main reason for the reduction of listed companies is the delisting of firms in coal mining and steel production
either involved in a long liquidation process or existing as corporate shells.
30 The database of the National Bank also comprises data on large shareholdings as reported in the annual reports.
However, the data on the Notifications of Ownership Changes are more detailed, often present organization charts of
pyramidal ownership structures and give all the ownership changes that took place during the fiscal year rather than
the ownership structure at the end of the fiscal year.
31 These five companies are : Delhaize Le Lion, HSPL, Koramic Building Products, SCF and Solvac. In some
companies, like Delhaize and Solvac, a family owns a substantial share stake, but this shareholding is held by several
members of the family who each hold less than 5% and consequently are not obliged to officially disclose their
holding.
32  The detailed frequency distribution is reported in Becht and Chapelle (1997).
33  Given that group blocks mostly coincide with voting blocks, we focus in this section on voting blocks.
34  The percentile plot of Figure 5 details the histogram data.
35  There was no shareholding of at least 25% of 17 sample companies (or 9% of the sample in 1989).
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36  To determine the ultimate controlling shareholder, we continued moving up in the shareholders’ pyramid when
the intermediate share stakes were (i) at least 50% or (ii) at least 25% in the absence of other shareholder with a stake
of more than 25% (in this last case the shareholder with more than 25% is likely to possess majority control of the
voting rights exercised on the annual meeting). If company A (a widely held company) owns 50% in company B
which owns 50% in company C, the ultimate levered control of company A in C is 25% (50% * 50%).
37  The columns with data on holding companies, families and industrial companies do not add up to the numbers in
the all investors column since the total cumulative concentrated ownership of this column is the sum of 8 investor
categories. Institutional investors, banks etc do not hold substantial stakes in the sample companies and are not show
in this table.
38  Since 1967 (See Article 1 of Royal Decree nr. 64 of 10 November 1967), there is a registration requirement for
Belgian holding companies with a portfolio value of over 0.5 billion BEF (£ 10 million). Company Law does not
distinguish between different holding categories and in this paper the NACE classification of the National Bank and of
the Bank Brussel Lambert is used. However, the group of holding companies is still rather heterogeneous and includes
holdings which are purely financial (e.g. Sofina), a combination of financial and industrial (Generale Maatschappij
van België / Société Générale de Belgique) or more like a conglomerate (Tractebel).
39  Law of 2 March 1993. The Royal Decree of 8 May 1990 had already allowed the credit institutions to purchase
shares up to 5% of their own funds since 1990.
40  Most share stakes held by institutional investors are under 5% and are as such not included in the analysis. Data
about investment funds should be interpreted with caution since some investment funds investing in Belgian shares are
domiciled in Luxembourg but managed by subsidiaries of Belgian banks. The Luxembourg authorities do not
differentiate according to nationality of the managers of the fund. Regarding institutional investor shareholdings, Van
der Elst (1998) reports a aggregate percentage of 17.7% of the votes in listed companies, while Wymeersch (1994b)
reports 22% for a sample of listed and non-listed firms.
41 Beleggingsfonds met veranderlijk kapitaal (Bevek)/ Société d'Investissement à Capital Variable (Sicav) (mutual
fund with variable capital).
42 Until the end of 1990, the investors in investment funds could not be represented by the investment fund on annual
general meetings of companies in which the investment fund held shares. In practice, this legal prohibition made it
impossible that the voting rights of shares held by investment funds were exercised. The legislation intended to avoid
that investment funds would become instruments of financial groups which could strengthen their control on quoted
companies. However, the result of this legislation was not neutral since the position of controlling shareholders was
even strengthened. The Law of 4 December 1990, article 112, abolished this prohibition and stated that the acts of
incorporation can determine in which cases the investment fund is to exercise the voting rights.
43 Ownership tables with the relative importance of each of the foreign shareholder classes (holding companies,
banks, institutional investors, insurance companies, industrial companies, families and the government) are available
upon request.
44 Shareholders of almost all the member states of the European Union, Switzerland, U.S.A., Canada, Japan, Panama,
Congo, Rwanda, Liberia and the Cayman Islands hold stakes of at least 5% in Belgian listed companies.
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Figure 1 : Direct  Stakes By Rank of Stake for All Listed Companies in 1995
Note: For each of the 135 notified companies the stakes were ranked. For blocks of equal size (ties) the average rank
was assigned. This was never the case for the largest stake. For each category the minimum, median, mean and
maximum were computed for all stakes in the category.
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Figure 2 : Histogram of The largest Direct Stakes in 1995
Note: Histogram with the maximum direct stake for 135 notified companies. The five companies with no notified












Figure 3 : Voting Blocks By Rank of Block for All Listed Companies in 1995
Note: For each of the 135 notified companies the blocks were ranked. For blocks of equal size the same value the
average rank was assigned. This was never the case for the largest stake. For each category the minimum, median,
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Figure 4 : Histogram of  the largest Voting Block in 1995
Note: Histogram with the maximum voting block for 135 notified companies. The five companies with no notified












Figure 5: Percentile Plot of Largest voting Blocks
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Table 1a : Company Types : Liability, Partners and Managers
Names Limited Liability Minimum Capital Smallest Number of
Owners
Smallest Number of Managers Number of Firms
in Belgium
Private Firms
Société en Nom Collectif (SNC) No No 1 0
Commandite Simple –
Commenditaire 
No for the active managers (commandités)
commanditaires)
No 1 0




Société Privée à Limitée
Unique (SPRLU)
BEF 750,000 1 (Single Owner 1 13,300
Coopérative - Cooperatieve Yes, if specified in the statutes. BEF 750,000 1 16,600
Société en Commandite par Actions –
Vennootschap met Aandelen
Yes BEF 2,500,000 3 (the managers are partners







Names Deposit of statutes and of Transfer procedures Manager’s ownership Publicity of the list
of the partners
Société en Nom Collectif (SNC) Yes Submitted to the agreement of all other partners.
Notified in the firm’s register.
No limit Not allowed No
Société en Commandite Simple –
Commanditaire Vennootschap (SCS)
Yes Submitted to the agreement of all other partners.
Notified in the firm’s register.




Société Privée à responsabilité Limitée –
Vennootschap met Beperkte
Aansprakelijkheid (SPRL/BVBA)
Yes Restricted to agreed partners or submitted to the
agreement of half of the partners having ¾ of the capital.
Notified in the firm’s register.
No limit No limit. Must be bought
with reported profit. Voting rights
are suspended as long as owned by
the firm.
No
Société Privée à responsabilité Limitée
Unique (SPRLU)
Yes Submitted to the agreement of the single partner.
Transform the firm into a SPRL or another SPRLU.
Notified in the firm’s register.
100% - -
Société Coopérative - Cooperatieve
Vennootschap (SC/CV)
Yes No transfer allowed No limit Not allowed No
Public Firms
Société en Commandite par Actions –
Commanditaire Vennootschap met
Aandelen (SCA)
Yes No restriction to transfer. Notification in the register
if shares are nominative.
No limit for active
partners.
Same rules as for SA No
Société Anonyme/Naamloze
Vennootschap (SA/NV)
Yes No restriction to transfer. Notification in the register
if shares are nominative.
Ruled by the
statutes





Table 1c : Accounting Rules : Form, Contents and Control of Annual Accounts
Obligation to make and
deposit annual accounts
Information on ownership
in annual accounts ann. accounts
External control of annual Consolidated accounts
Private Firms
Société en Nom Yes Full or Abridged : it No No No
Société en 
Commanditaire Vennootschap (SCS)
id. No No No
Société Privée à Limitée –
Vennootschap met 
Aansprakelijkheid (SPRL/BVBA)
Yes No No No
Société responsabilité Limitée Yes id. No Yes







Yes Yes, for shareholders
owning more than 10% of the
Yes, from 10% of one
category of shares in a firm. officially agreed (réviseurs) if the
Yes if the firm is
large enough controls
Société en Commandite par Actions Yes id. id. id.
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Table 2 : Frequency distribution of direct shareholdings, group blocks
and voting blocks
1995 Direct Stakes Group Blocks Voting Blocks
No. Frequency Percent Cum. % Frequen. Percent Cum. % Frequen. Percent Cum. %
1 25 18.5 18.5 38 28.2 28.2 60 44.4 44.4
2 19 14.1 32.6 35 25.9 54.1 43 31.9 76.3
3 23 17.0 49.6 17 12.6 66.7 19 14.1 90.4
4 11 8.2 57.8 12 8.9 75.6 7 5.2 95.6
5 13 9.6 67.4 10 7.4 83.0 2 1.5 97.0
6 7 5.2 72.6 10 7.4 90.4 1 0.7 97.8
7 6 4.4 77.0 3 2.2 92.6 2 1.5 99.3
8 5 3.7 80.7 2 1.5 94.1 1 0.7 100.0
9 5 3.7 84.4 2 1.5 95.6 - - -
10 6 4.4 88.9 3 2.2 97.8 - - -
11 3 2.2 91.1 1 0.7 98.5 - - -








Notes : Group blocks are the sum of those direct shareholdings controlled by the same ultimate investor. Voting
blocks consist of a combination of group blocks when ultimate investors controlling those group blocks have formed
a voting pact regarding the conditions under which voting rights are exercised or regarding priority rights in case of
selling the group block. The data are for 1995.
Source : Own calculations based on DBPart, individual notifications and annual reports
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Table 3: Size concentration of large direct shareholdings and of voting blocks
Panel A  : Direct shareholdings
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% % % %
C1 : Largest shareholding 44.75 20.88 5.22 99.76
C3 : Sum of largest 3 stakes 59.28 20.1 15.25 99.97
C5 : Sum of largest 5 stakes 62.25 19.42 15.76 99.97
C20 : Sum of largest 20 stakes 63.75 19.2 15.76 99.97
Call : Sum of all stakes 63.83 19.18 15.76 99.97
Panel B : Ultimate voting blocks
Measure Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% % % %
C1 : Largest ultimate voting block 55.77 19.8 8.45 99.76
C3 : Sum of largest 3 voting blocks 62.6 19.03 15.76 99.97
C5 : Sum of largest 5 voting blocks 63.19 19.08 15.76 99.97
C20 : Sum of largest 20 voting blocks 63.37 19.07 15.76 99.97
Call : Sum of all voting blocks 63.37 19.07 15.76 99.97
Notes : This table shows the average of the largest direct shareholdings and the sum of the 3, 5, 20 and all direct
shareholdings (panel A). Panel B shows similar measures, but based on ultimate voting blocks in 1995.
Source : Own calculations based on DBPart, individual notifications and annual reports
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Table 4 : Ownership concentration in all Belgian companies listed on the Brussels
Stock Exchange











Panel A : All sample companies (155 firms)
Direct shareholdings 65.4 32.7 3.9 14.6 49.4 16.0
Ultimate voting blocks 65.4 26.7 15.6 10.8 39.6 24.4
Panel B: Holding companies (64 firms)
Direct shareholdings 63.9 36.7 5.2 13.1 46.9 17.1
Ultimate voting blocks 63.9 34.4 14.1 8.3 36.1 28.0
Panel C : Financial sector (banks, insurance and real estate) (19 firms)
Direct shareholdings 70.0 26.5 1.2 5.5 55.0 15.0
Ultimate voting blocks 70.0 26.2 5.3 5.4 38.4 23.6
Panel D : industrial and commercial companies (72 firms)
Direct shareholdings 65.5 30.8 3.5 18.3 50.2 15.3
Ultimate voting blocks 65.5 20.0 19.7 14.5 43.0 21.4
Notes : This table aggregates the shareholdings of 5% of more held by the main shareholder categories. The shareholder
classes (holding companies, industrial and commercial companies, and families) consist of both Belgian and foreign
investors. 'Ultimate voting blocks’ means that those direct shareholdings controlled by the same ultimate shareholder or
belong to a voting coalition are summed.
Source : Own calculations based on information from the BDPart database of the Brussels Stock  Exchange, ownership
notifications of the documentation centre of the Brussels Stock Exchange and annual reports
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Table 5 :  Number and Size of Voting Blocks per Blockholder.
Voting Blockholder Name Number
of Companies
Min. Block Max. Block Mean Block Median
Société Générale de Belgique –
Compagie Financière de Suez (Fr)
12 0.03 94.96 40.15 45.42
Banque Paribas - Cobepa (Fr) 10 3.06 81.35 45.44 39.36
Soges Star Fund (B) 10 1.51 5 3.96 4.43
Groupe familial Boel (B) 7 9.89 69.79 41.81 45.05
Groupe familial Van der Mersch (B) 6 13.99 82.56 52.97 67.1
Société Générale de Belgique (B-Fr) 4 50.19 69.98 59.31 58.53
Sofina (B) 4 3.8 71.4 24.7 11.8
Famille Saverys (B) 4 0.02 24 6.07 0.12
Almanij Holding Group (B) 3 40.35 94.98 70.46 76.05
Mr. Guy Paquot (B) 3 50.42 70.43 62.17 65.65
Groupe familial Janssen (B) 3 32.13 71.98 57.32 67.86
Groupe AG - Fortis (B) 3 1.76 10.73 5.26 3.3
Banque Degroof (B) 3 2.94 7 4.74 4.28
Lonrho Belgium (B) 2 77.9 81.83 79.87 79.87
Groupe Bruxelles Lambert (B) 2 60.31 73.62 66.96 66.96
Groupe Danone (Fr) 2 5.3 89.33 47.32 47.32
Région Wallonne (B) 2 13.27 79.79 46.53 46.53
Banques Paribas (Fr) 2 7.68 75.23 41.46 41.46
Heideberg Zement Groupe (G) 2 33.52 44.41 38.97 38.97
Artois- Piedboeuf-Interbrew Groupe (B) 2 34.83 35.28 35.06 35.06
Gewestelijke Investerings-maatschappij
voor Vlaqnderen (B)
2 9.99 47.14 28.56 28.56
Ackermans Van Haaren Groupe (B) 2 3.39 50.51 26.95 26.95
Royale Belge / Union des Assurances de
Paris Groupe (B/Fr)
2 3.49 14.99 9.24 9.24
Groupe des Assurances Generale de
France (Fr)
2 7.24 8.75 7.99 7.99
Mutuelle Solvay (B) 2 2.87 12.6 7.74 7.74
Groupe Familial Verbert (B) 2 5 5 5 5
Mercury Asset Management Group
(UK)
2 4.64 4.76 4.7 4.7
Cobepa Holding (B-Fr) 2 0.65 7.41 4.03 4.03
Total Holders w. 2 Blocks or more 102
Total All Blockholders 269
Notes : The table reports summary statistics over these shareholder classes. Among blockholders, the case of the SUEZ /
Generale Maatschappij van België (Générale de Belgique (GMB/SGB) group, with a portfolio of 73 stakes in 16 different
listed firms (12 + 4), is the most striking example of the presence of French shareholders on the Brussels Stock Exchange.
Paribas is another significant example.  Soges is a special case since it is an investment fund. Soges belongs to the GBL
group but it acts independently for its investments. This type of shareholder holds relatively small stakes (no more than 5%)
and it is not an active shareholder. Besides holding companies, Belgian family groups are important: Boël, Janssen, Van der
Mersch own large family holdings which often hold controlling blocks in several listed firms. Source : Own calculations
based on information from the BDPart database of the Brussels Stock  Exchange, ownership notifications of the
documentation centre of the Brussels Stock Exchange and annual reports.
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Table 6 :  Ownership concentration by type of ultimate blockholder.
Blockholder Type Number of Block-
holders of this Type
Mean Min. Max.  Median
Belgian State 1 50 50 50 50
Individuals (Belgian) 51 27.66 0.02 82.33 13.99
Individuals (Foreign) 2 39.48 7.85 71.1 39.48
Individuals (French) 1 84.15 84.15 84.15 84.15
Belgian Listed Firm 25 32.69 0.19 81.83 32.07
Belgian Listed Firm – Foreign French Firm 1 62.82 62.82 62.82 62.82
Belgian Non Listed Firm 49 25.06 0.14 96.58 9.25
Belgian Non Listed Firm - Foreign Firm 1 69.71 69.71 69.71 69.71
Belgian Non Listed Firm - Foreign French
Firm
3 58.31 53.88 61.5 59.54
Foreign Firm 4 24.14 3.24 60.76 16.28
Foreign German Firm 1 33.52 33.52 33.52 33.52
Foreign French Firm 22 32.44 0.03 88.77 30.35
Foreign French Firm - Belgian Listed Firm 1 45.86 45.86 45.86 45.86
Foreign French Firm - Belgian Non Listed
Firm
1 65.34 65.34 65.34 65.34
Foreign Italian Firm 1 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.58
Foreign Japanese Firm 2 37.24 6.94 67.53 37.24
Foreign Firm of  Luxembourg 13 29.02 3.12 59.87 20.32
Foreign Dutch Firm 3 39.44 3.91 57.43 56.97
Foreign Swiss Firm 3 4.74 3.11 5.9 5.22
Foreign British Firm 3 5.6 4.76 6.99 5.06
Foreign American Firm 4 37.77 3.05 84.17 31.93
Flemish Government 1 99.76 99.76 99.76 99.76
Walloon Government 1 13.27 13.27 13.27 13.27
State of Zaire 1 11.88 11.88 11.88 11.88
Note: Each of the 195 blockholders was classified. The table reports summary statistics by class of owner.
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Table 7 : Largest direct and ultimate levered shareholdings,
and the control leverage factor.
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
sample size 160 156 156 156 152 146
ultimate ownership level Mean (%) 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.1 2
Std. Dev.(%) 1.364 1.29 1.188 1.159 1.002 0.956
























control leverage factor Mean (%) 3.6 3.6 3 2.9 2.8 2.7
(direct/ultimate shareholding) Std. Dev.(%) 8.391 8.65 6.756 6.71 6.556 6.86
Notes : This table presents the ultimate ownership level, defined as the highest level of ownership in an uninterrupted
control chain (direct shareholdings are level 1). Ultimate control is control based on (i) a majority control (minimal 50% of
the voting rights) on every ownership tier of the ownership pyramid or (ii) shareholdings of at least 25% on every tier in the
absence of other shareholders holding stakes of 25% or more. A chain of fully owned subsidiaries are considered as one
single shareholder. The direct largest shareholding is the average direct largest share stake of at least 25%. The ultimate
levered shareholding is calculated by multiplying the share stakes of subsequent ownership tiers. The control leverage factor
is the ratio of the direct shareholding divided by the ultimate levered shareholding. For instance, company A, whose shares
are widely held, owns 40% of company B which, in turn, owns 40% of company C. The ultimate shareholder level is 2, the
direct largest shareholding (of B in C) is 40%, the ultimate shareholding is 16% (40% x 40%), and the leverage factor is 2.5
(40/16). There was no direct shareholding of at least 25% in 17 sample companies, which were not included in this table.
Standard deviation in parentheses.
Source : Own calculations based on data from the BDPart database and the Notifications of ownership.
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Appendix: The Frére-Desmarais Pyramid1
Overall Structure
The Frére-Desmarais pyramid has a double vertex. On the European side Baron Albert Frére presides
over a control chain that involves a family holding, two non-listed Belgian holdings, a listed Belgian
holding and a Dutch holding company. On the Canadian side, Paul Desmarais Sr. controls three companies
that control the Power Corporation of Canada and the Power Financial Corporation, two listed companies.
The non-listed holdings are used to bring in the capital of "friends" through share blocks. The listed
companies are used to collect funds from capital markets. There are several instances when legal devices
(such as dual class shares with multiple voting rights) are used to leverage voting power relative to cash-
flow rights, even at the level of the individual pyramid companies.
The two control chains meet in a Dutch holding company (Parjointco N.V.), in which each partner
holds 50% of the capital and voting rights. Parjointco controls the Swiss Pargesa Holding S.A. that is
listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange. Pargesa is the point of entry to the group's portfolio. Portfolio
companies fall into two groups (see Figure 6):
• Controlled companies (e.g. Petrofina)
• Friendly minority blocks with "friends", often involving distant cross-shareholdings with companies
higher up in the pyramid, particularly on the Benelux side (e.g. Suez, Paribas, AXA-UAP)
The Desmarais control chain, the Frére control chain and the Pargesa portfolio can be cut in three sub-
cascades:
The Canadian Chain
The Canadian pillar of the pyramid is controlled by Mr. Paul Desmarais. It consists of 5 companies :
Gelco Enterprises, Pansolo Holding Inc., 3439496 Canada Inc., Power Corporation of Canada and Power
Financial Corporation.
Gelco Enterprises, Pansolo Holding Inc. and 3439496 Canada Inc. are directly controlled by Mr.
Desmarais (see Figure 7). The exact ownership structure is not disclosed (source : Management Circular of
the Power Corporation of Canada, circulated prior to the meeting of May 15 1998 with data for April 7
1998).
1 Unless noted otherwise, all annual report information is for 31 December 1997. The information from
Canadian management circulars is for the first annual meeting in 1998.
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On April 7 1998, Mr. Desmarais controlled 64.9% of the votes of Power Corporation of Canada
and 30.5% of its capital. The ultimate ownership stake of Mr. Desmarais can not be computed at this level
because the leverage achieved through the three holding companies cannot be traced. "Beneficial
ownership" in Canadian proxy statements refers to voting rights, not cash-flow rights. The leverage at the
level of Power Corporation of Canada is achieved through a dual class capitalisation and multiple voting
rights. Power Corporation has issued three types of shares : Non-participating with 0 votes, participating
preferred shares with 10 votes and subordinate voting with 1 vote. Mr. Desmarais controlled 99.5% of the
votes attached to the preferred shares and 21.8% of the subordinate shares.
Mr. Paul Desmarais receives $250,000 per year as the Chairman. All other directors received $15,000
(the chairman of the audit and compensation committee received and additional $10,000 and all director
receive a bonus of $1,000 for each meeting they attend). Mr. Desmarais has been the Chairman of the
Executive Committee of the company since 1968. Mr. André Desmarais and Mr. Paul Desmarais Jr. are
the two Co-Chief executives. They received a salary of $700,000 plus $1,000,000 in bonus respectively in
1998 (source : Management Circular of the Power Corporation of Canada, circulated prior to the meeting
of May 15 1998 with data for April 7 1998).
On December 31 1997 the Subordinate Voting Shares were listed on The Montreal Exchange, The
Toronto Stock Exchange, and the Vancouver Stock Exchange. The Participating Preferred Shares are
listed on The Montreal Exchange. (source : Annual Report 1997).
Power Financial Corporation collects additional funds from the markets. The company controls
several financial services companies in the United Kingdom and holds a 50% stake in the joint investment
vehicle of Paul Desmarais Sr. and Albert Frére : the Dutch holding company Parjointco. The 50% stake in
Parjointco N.V. is held via Power Financial Corporation B.V. a wholly owned subsidiary of Power
Financial Corporation registered in Rotterdam in the Netherlands.
The Benelux Pillar
The Frére Group consists of a chained series of holding companies. It is headed by the Frére-
Bourgeois Group which is said to include a Dutch holding company registered in Rotterdam and a Dutch
trust company. The capital is owned to 100% by Baron Albert Frére and his family (see Figure 8).
The first holding company (Erbe Group) provides a link with the French Paribas banking group.
Pargesa, the Swiss investment holding company controlled by Parjointco, holds a 1.9% stake in Paribas,
which provides for some double gearing.
The second holding company brings in capital from AXA-UAP, the Suez Group (via its Belgian
holding company, Generale Maatschappij van België/Societé General de Belgique) and Electrafina, a
Parjointco/Pargesa controlled company. Pargesa holds a 0.7% stake in AXA. Parjointco/Pargesa/GBL and
AXA jointly control the Royal Belge. Hence, there is a considerable degree of double gearing at the
second level of the control chain.
The third level of the chain collects funds from shareholders through the Brussels market. The
Nationale Portefeulle Maatschappij (NPM) or Compagnie Nationale à Portefeuille (CNP) is the main
investment vehicle of Baron Frère. It is at this level that we learn most about the European activities of the
Frére-Desmarais group.
The fourth level is a Dutch holding company that is controlled by the family holding (51% of the
votes) but majority owned by the listed company (89.5% of the cash-flow rights).
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Finally, the Dutch holding company owns 50% of the Parjointco holding, the joint investment vehicle
of the Frére-Desmarais group. At this level the Frére-Bourgeois cash-flow stake in Parjointco is, not
taking into account the double gearing, 0.55x0.57x0.54x0.9 = 0.15 + 0.105 = 25.5%.
The Pargesa and NPM/CNP Portfolios
The portfolio of the group is not held directly by the Dutch Parjointco holding, but by the Swiss
Pargesa holding (see Figures 9 and 10). Pargesa is listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange and brings in
additional funds from the market and, again, from the French Paribas group. The voting power of
Parjointco and Paribas is leveraged through a dual class share capitalization.
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Figure 6. Overall Structure of the Pyramid
Note : The data refer to 31 December 1997.  Listed companies are framed with emphasis or printed bold-face. Indirect
links are represented by dashed lines, direct links by solid lines. Voting rights are between brackets, while cash flow rights




Cash-flow : 55.0%       Votes :  62.4%
Paul Desmarais Albert Frére
49.4% (49.4) GBL , B
67.7% (88.3) Parfinance, F
83.1% (83.1) Orior, CH
36.8% (54.4) Imétal, F
  5.4% (22.7) Petrofina, B
  2.7% (11.2) Suez, F
  6.1% (49.0) CLT-UFA, L
  6.3% (12.9) Royale Belge, B
  1.3% (1.9) Paribas, F





Figure 7. The Canadian Control Chain
Note : Listed companies are bold-faced. Control is exerted via a series of holding companies. Unknown amounts of
external capital are collected via three holding companies. Substantial amounts of external capital are collected via two listed
companies. The ultimate cash-flow stake of Mr. Desmarais in Parjointco is smaller than 10.35%. Listed companies are









Cash-flow : 30.5%       Votes :  64.7%
Parjointco N.V.
(via Power Financial Europe B.V.)
Cash-flow :67.7%       Votes :  67.7%
Cash-flow : 50%        Votes :  50%
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Figure 8. The Belgian Control Chain
Note : Voting rights are between brackets, while cash flow rights are not. Source : Unless indicated otherwise, all




























Figure 9. The NPM/CNP Portfolio











and consolidated financial holdings
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48.9 % balance sheet
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Figure 10. The Parjointco Portfolio
Source : NPM/CNP, Annual Report
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(1) shares acquired at the end of the year did not contribute to the 1997 profit
0.3 % Balance sheet
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C 11.2 %
V 10.1 %
